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DESDE EL MERO MEDIO
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OF CONFLICT
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Indiana, 1987

E xcerpt

from

C hapter 4

RIOTS ON DIVISION S TR H T

...During the summer
of 1966 the city of Chicago
became the site of the first
major urban Puerto Rican riot
in the history of the United
States. The outburst was one in
a series of urban protest riots
which raged in American soci
ety, primarily among blacks,
from the end of World War II
until the last years of the
1960s. Puerto Rican behavior
in Chicago during the summer
of 1966 mirrored the dilemma
of exploited, non-white people
in the United States: whether
to withstand the rejection of
the majority in the hope that
ameliorative action would bring
rewards within the system or
to lash out and destroy the
“hated environment”, thus
abruptly focusing the attention
of the majority and bringing
release for oneself.
Division Street Riot, June 13-16, 1966
Courtesy of Chicago Sun-Times

Police Commander James C. Holzman (pointing) issues orders after
taking over new duties in Division Street hot spot area. June 15, 1966
he Puerto Rican riot occurred
almost at the same time that var
ious national and local govern
mental agencies were taking precau
tionary measures to head off rioting
in major American cities. The two
preceding years had witnessed some
of the largest and most intense black
disturbances ever—Harlem, Watts,
Detroit, Philadelphia, etc. In order to
prevent future outbursts, the Justice
Department instructed its Assistant
United States Attorneys to report on
conditions in a score of communities
considered particularly “inflamma
ble”. The Vice P resident’s Task
Force on Youth Opportunity autho
rized its field representatives to
investigate potential trouble spots
and offer short-term recommenda
tions. These findings were to be
made available to federal agencies
involved in the black ghettos.
Government officials throughout the
country devised emergency pro
grams to employ and entertain black
youths and otherwise keep them off
the streets, while local and state
police departm ents aided by the
F.B.I. prepared coordinated riot-con
trol plans. (These measures were
not designed to alleviate conditions
in the ghettos but merely to prevent
their manifestation ever—Harlem).
Hence, it was with mounting appre
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hension that local and federal offi
cials awaited the summer.
They did not have to wait long.
The Puerto Rican riot erupted in
June, and was followed by distur
bances among blacks in battered
cities previously stricken and cities
hitherto spared, Omaha, Dayton, San
Francisco, and Atlanta. The summer
of 1966 was the most violent yet.
The Puerto Rican riot began June
12, 1966 when a white policeman
shot and wounded a young Puerto
Rican man, Arcelis Cruz, twenty
years old, near the intersection of
Division Street and Damen Avenue in
the Westtown community. After the
shooting, the situation at the
Division-Damen intersection intensi
fied when the police brought dogs
into the fray and a Puerto Rican was
bitten. For three days and nights, a
Puerto Rican crowd demonstrated
against police brutality. And each
time the police tried to disperse the
crowd, it only succeeded in arousing
them.
From June 12 to June 14, Puerto
Ricans not only defied the police, but
also looted and burned neighbor
hood businesses, particularly those
identified as white-owned. The city’s
Puerto Rican leaders pleaded with
the rioters to return to their homes,

but to little avail. The Chicago SunTimes (June 14, 1966:1) reports that
at one rally, organized during the sec
ond day of the riot and held at the
intersection of Division Street and
California Avenue, community orga
nization leaders and clergymen
urged the crowd of 3,000 to halt the
violence. Immediately after the rally,
however, rocks and bricks were
thrown at policemen. Meanwhile the
police department ordered all avail
able personnel into the Division
Street area to quell the rioting,
and on June 15, order was finally
restored. By this time, it was official
ly acknowledged that 16 persons
were injured, 49 were arrested, over
50 buildings were destroyed, and mil
lions of dollars accrued in damages.
...The state of police-Puerto Rican
relations before the riot was a major
source of Puerto Rican frustration
and accounts for the presence of a
generalized belief which, following
Smelser’s approach, became the nec
essary ingredient in producing this
collective action. For many years
Puerto Ricans attempted, without any
success, to bring to light the ample
evidence of discriminatory beatings
and humiliations, as in the case of
Gonzalez-Burgos described in the
preceding chapter. The numerous
hostile and abrasive encounters
between the police and barrio resi
dents, particularly those incidents
perceived by the Puerto Rican com
munity as inflammatory and as acts
of injustice or insults to the Puerto
Rican community, were the trigger
ing events of the 1966 riot. As psy
chologist Leonard Berkowitz points
out in his discussion of civil violence
among blacks: “[The police] are the
‘head thumpers’, the all too-often hos
tile enforcers of laws arbitrarily
imposed upon [blacks] by an alien
world” (1968:48).
The society’s bases of legitimacy
and authority had been attacked.
Law and order had long been
viewed by Puerto Ricans as the white
man’s law and order, but now
this characteristic perspective of a
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Puerto Rican residents of the Division Street area
shared a pervasive belief that policemen were
physically brutal, harsh, and discourteous to
them because they were Puerto Ricans.. .
colonized people was out in the
open. Puerto Rican residents of the
Division Street Area shared a perva
sive belief that policemen were phys
ically brutal, harsh, and discourte
ous to them because they were
Puerto Ricans; that policemen did
not respond to calls, enforce the law,
or protect people who lived in this
community because they were
Puerto Ricans. Their grievances
about police brutality and inadequa
cy of protection yielded the deep
sense of hostility and resentment
prevalent among other ethnic minor
ity groups in urban America.
...The testimonies of fifty-four wit
nesses at a public hearing held a
month following the Division Street
Riot (Friday and Saturday, July 15
and 16, 1966) provide further evi
dence of the negative appraisals of
police behavior by barrio residents.
According to the summary report of
the hearings entitled “The Puerto
Rican Residents of Chicago, a Report
on an Open Hearing,” of six major
problem areas identified by the wit
nesses, relations between Puerto
Rican residents and the police was
the most pressing and in most need
of corrective action. In fact, one wit
ness expressed the point that since
the state of Puerto Rican-police rela
tions was so incredibly poor, “a com
prehensive community action pro
gram against social injustice” needed
to be established in the community.
Yet the police became a main
focal point for attack not only
because of their attitude and behav
ior toward Puerto Ricans, but
Dialogo/10

because they symbolized the
despised invisible white power struc
ture. Of the institutional contacts
with which barrio residents had inti
mate contact schools, social welfare
and employment agencies, medical
facilities, and business owners the
police embodied the most crushing
authority. For many Puerto Ricans,
the police had come to represent
more than enforcement of law; they
were viewed as members of an “occu
pying army” and as an oppressive
force acting on behalf of those who
ruled their environment.
Some city officials and other crit
ics of the riots used what social scien
tists have called the “criminal riffraff’
theory of rioting in explaining the
outburst (e.g., Fogelson and Hill,
1968). According to this view, every
large urban ghetto contains a dispro
portionate num ber of criminals,
delinquents, unemployed, school
dropouts, and other social misfits
who on the slightest pretext are
ready to riot, loot, and exploit an
explosive social situation for their pri
vate gain and for satisfying their
aggressive anti-social instincts. After
meeting in City Hall with residents
from the Division Street Area, Mayor
Daley made a statement to the press
appealing especially to the neighbor
hood parents to keep their children
off the streets. “Such action should
be taken,” stressed the Mayor, “in
areas where unthinking and irre
sponsible individuals and gangs are
seeking a climate of violence and
uncertainty that threatens lives
and property” (Chicago Sun-Times,

June 15,1966).
Thus, according to city officials
and others, the basic source of the
trouble was not to be found among
long-standing and well established
residents of the Puerto Rican com
munity, an otherwise tranquil and
satisfied populace. Such a view
contained important advantages for
city officials who widely espoused it.
...Viewed from a different point,
the Division Street Riot was the
action of a people, poor and dispos
sessed and crushed in large numbers
in el barrio, who rose up in wrath
against a society committed to demo
cratic ideals. Their outburst was an
expression of powerlessness resent
ment against racial prejudice, anger
at the unreachable affluence around
them , and frustration at their
sociopolitical powerlessness. Puerto
Ricans had gradually developed an
urban consciousness—a conscious
ness of an entrapped ethnic minority.
The sense of entrapment stemmed
from the inability of the Puerto
Ricans to break out of the urban
ghetto and become part of the bur
geoning middle class. There were
conditions of deprivation in the
Puerto Rican community that since
the 1966 riot have come to be widely
recognized as very real grievances.
Frustration and alienation accentuat
ed by feelings of relative deprivation
must be regarded as psychological
factors that create a readiness for
individuals to give vent to what
Smelser calls collective behavior.
It was during this time that some
Puerto Ricans sensed the possibility
of improvement; in fact, they had
become quite dissatisfied with their
situation and rebelled against it. And
“with rebellion,” as Albert Camus
(1967:247) puts it, “awareness is
born,” and with awareness, an impa
tience “which can extend to every
thing that [people] had previously
accepted, and which is almost always
retroactive.” Puerto Ricans began to
realize, perhaps for the first time in

their lives, that the signs advertising
“American egalitarianism” did not
include them. Puerto Ricans found
themselves on the outside looking
in. Since coming to Chicago they
had remained on the metaphoric
margin, apart from, not a part of, the
important positions of America’s
institutional life they represented a
population whose participation in the
political and economic systems
occurred at the lowest reaches of
these structures. Thus, a population
of Spanish-speaking people that used
to see the proverbial glass as half full
now saw it as half empty.
...Puerto Ricans began vowing to
fight to change their conditions and
their way to power. There was a dif
ference in both the tone and the
tempo of their protest: the tone was
bitter and the tempo frenetic. There
had been times when expressions of
anger, hatred, and hostility had burst
out in the Division Street Area in the
form of small acts of aggression
against representatives of the domi
nant group or against other minority

group members. But it was the col
lective support given this expressed
hostility, permitting the spread and
intensification of it in reckless defi
ance of police power, that made the
outburst an instance of collective
behavior that was more than just
another race riot.
In the Puerto Rican community a
sense of betrayal of expectations
brought about a focus on the griev
ances of the past and present. The
visibility of an affluent, comfortable,
middle-class life made possible by a
powerful mass communications sys
tem was in itself enough to induce
dual feelings of resentment and emu
lation. The failure of society to effec
tively raise the status of those
trapped in el barrio contributed to the
smoldering resentments. The urge to
retaliate, to return the hurts and the
injustices, played an integral part of
the Division Street Riot. In short, the
1966 riot erupted as a new generation
of Puerto Ricans sensed that persua
sion was not going to bring an end to
subordination and oppression. They

Club-weilding policeman round up on West Division Street during second
night of violence. June 14, 1966,

saw that the Puerto Rican communi
ty was far more powerless than the
earlier successes of Los Caballeros
might suggest. The Puerto Rican
community took to the streets in defi
ance of both the obdurate white com
munity and the older Puerto Rican
leadership who had tried to win the
battle for equality without bloodshed.
Tired of promises of things to come,
bitterly frustrated by ghetto-living,
and seething with a hatred born of
denial, they sought action.

RISC OF A POLITICIZED
ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS
The 1966 riot represents a major
watershed in the history of Puerto
Ricans in Chicago. For one thing, it
demonstrated the depth of Puerto
Rican discontent, the extent of
Puerto Rican anger and hate, and the
ease with which Puerto Rican anger
and hate could flare into violence.
More important, the riot raised the
anger to a new pitch. When the
police dogs were unleashed on the
corner of Damen and Division Street,
every Puerto Rican in the city felt
their teeth in the marrow of his or
her bones. The explosion of anger
and hatred that resulted for a
moment, at least, broke through the
traditionally alleged apathy of the
poor and created an almost universal
desire to act. The Puerto Rican poor
were able to overcome the shame
bred by a society which blamed them
for their plight; they were able to
break the bonds of conformity
enforced by their jobs and by every
strand of institutional life; they were
able to overcome the fears induced
by the city’s police force.
Of course not all Puerto Ricans
took up the banner of militancy.
Indeed, many, perhaps even the
majority were frightened at the turn
of events. Yet there is little doubt that
sympathy for the sentiment underly
ing the “new militancy” touched all
Puerto Ricans in the city. One of the
D ialogo/11

Courtesy: Chicago Sun-TImes

m o re v alu ab le g ro u p a s s e ts to
em erge from the 1966 riot was an
“awakening” among the m asses of
the Puerto Rican poor. This awaken
ing led to an increased ethnic con
sciousness am ong P uerto Ricans:
the partisan behavior and sense of
group obligation that more and more
P uerto Ricans began to exhibit in
trying to overcome their conditions.
Advocacy for P uerto Rican ethnic
consciousness began to show up in
various forms.
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n ad d itio n to several peace ral
lies held at Humbolt Park, commu
nity le a d e rs o rg an iz ed se v era l
major meetings during and after the
riot to inform and interpret issues
w ith re sid e n ts of the com m unity.
T h e Latin A m erican Boys Club,
located on 1218 N. Washtenaw Street
in the h e a rt of the Division Street
Area, becam e the leading site for
these gatherings. At times, Puerto
Rican leaders m et there with police
officials and hum an relations staff
w orkers to devise ways to prevent
future disturbances (Chicago Daily
News, June 13,1966). Several march
es and d em o n stratio n s w ere also
org an ized . On Ju n e 28, over 200
P u e rto Rican re s id e n ts of th e
Division Street Area m arched five
m iles to City Hall to p ro te st w hat
they had come to interpret as police
brutality and the failure of the city
administration to recognize “Puerto
Rican problem s.” The Puerto Rican
community also rallied to show sup
p o rt for those arrested during the
riot.
The Coordinating Commission of
Puerto Rican Affairs was formed to
help bail out those who had been
imprisoned. Hundreds of barrio resi
dents jam m ed into the courtroom
where Puerto Ricans arrested during
the riot were being tried. A Chicago
Daily News’ story, “Judge’s Warning:
R e sp e c t th e P o lic e ,” in d ic a te d
that, conversing in Spanish, the spec
ta to rs p ro v id ed c o n s ta n t m oral
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Persons involved in violent street fighting a t Division. Witnesses and lawyers
appear in North Boys Court. June 16, 1966
en couragem ent to the defendants
(June 13,1966).
...The post-riot period did witness
a steady decline in the relative social
status of some of the earlier Puerto
Rican elite. Social standing and the
legitimacy to speak on issues pertain
ing to the Puerto Rican community
began to shift to a lead ersh ip not
directly connected to Los Caballeros
or com m unity organizations of the
early adjustment period.
The old establishm ent was also
challenged by the increasing effec
tiveness of an em erging leadership
comprised of few members of the old
guard who had broken ranks and a
large num ber of young, articulate,
and brash new leaders. The leader
ship of the Puerto Rican community,
no longer in the exclusive hands of
first-generation Puerto Ricans, began
to question the traditional goals of
the program s led by the old guard.
A fter 1966 th e new le a d e rsh ip of
P u e rto R icans in c re a sin g ly gave
voice to an ideology that challenged
the assimilationist perspective of Los
Caballeros and other early organiza
tions. Like the old guard’s approach,
the new lead ers assum ed th at th e

grow in g w hite h o stility could be
dealt with if Puerto Ricans developed
and organized their own economic
and civic institutions. On the other
hand, this philosophy also called for
counterattack; the new leadership
em phasized p ro te st ag ain st injus
tices. It began to m ount broad and
all-embracing attacks upon the forces
of oppression of the larger American
society. The lines betw een the two
ideological cam ps were not always
clearly drawn. At tim es, the issues
were spelled out; at other times, they
were only implicit. But regardless of
the many variations and complexi
tie s , C h icag o ’s e m e rg in g P u e rto
Rican leaders were engaged in a new
and different approach directly relat
ed to th e c o u rse of P u e rto Rican
development in the city.
The Young Lords represent one of
th e various activist, d irect action,
organizational efforts among Puerto
R icans in C hicago from th e mid1960s onw ard. D espite th e Young
Lords’ political activism and a gener
al increase of civic activities among
b a rrio resid e n ts, in the m ain, the
people of the Division S treet Area
w ere not in a position to establish
action-oriented com m unity institu

tions and organizations that would
adequately meet the needs of the
growing Puerto Rican community.
Most Puerto Rican businesses were
undercapitalized and the existing
cultural and social service organiza
tions and agencies lacked the finan
cial resources to develop satisfactory
facilities and to hire adequate profes
sional staffs to deal with the many
problems operative in el barrio. It
was the indirect result of the expan
sion into the Division Street Area of
“Community Action Program s”
(CAP), established throughout the
country during the early 1960s as
part of the federal government’s War
Against Poverty, which contributed
to the development of some of these
structures as well as toward the
growth of a new leadership.
he outburst of racial violence
on Division Street during the
summer of 1966 produced a
political response from city officials
in the form of community action pro
grams to address the complex social
problems of el barrio. In turn, these
programs were used to produce a
politicized and activist agenda by
somePuerto Ricans. Federally fund
ed Community Action Programs,
channeled through the city’s political
system, then, became the leading
mechanism for the institutionaliza
tion of barrio-based politics or
activist social action. Several of the
Community Action Programs estab
lished in the Division Street Area
during this period were transformed
from community service agencies
into local political structures; they
were used to politicize inactive bar
rio residents, i.e., welfare mothers,
g a n g s, u n e m p lo y e d , sc h o o l
dropouts, and the like.
...The most important CAP estab
lished by the city public officials and
used by some Puerto Ricans to politi
cize area residents was an urban
progress center. The Division Street
Urban Progress Center, put into
place immediately following the riot
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on Division Street, represented the
first program of this kind to service
any of the city’s Spanish-speaking
populations. It began as an outpost of
the Garfield Park Community Center,
but shortly thereafter became a ser
vice agency of its own. The initial
location, 2120 W. Division Street, was
near the spot where the civil distur
bances had occurred a month earlier.
Like other urban progress centers in
the city, the neighborhood center
was a multi-service program estab
lished to coordinate the activities of
governmental and, at times, private
agencies servicing the Division
Street Area. Further, a series of Title
II Community Action Program agen
cies, as well as others funded outside
this title, were housed in the Center.
Many other programs from the
arsenal of weapons used in the pover
ty war were also established through
out the Division Street community
and housed in the Center. To close
the gap between barrio residents and
the nonpoor, manpower training—
both institutional and on-the-job—
was required. Hence, the Job Corps,
the Neighborhood Youth Corps
(NYC), the Manpower Development
and Training ACT (MDTA), JOBS,
and Work Incentive Programs (WIN)
were either established or scheduled
for rapid expansion into this commu
nity during and after the summer
of 1966. Head Start, Teacher Corps,
and Title I of the Aid to Education
Act were also launched to assist the
children of that generation in prepar

ing for school and in receiving better
and more schooling. Further, a
Neighborhood Health Center was set
into place to subsidize the medical
expenses of welfare recipients and
the medically indigent.
In short, the Division Street
Urban Progress Center was a
catchall for projects to aid the poor—
practically any effort aimed at reduc
ing poverty could be found as part of
the structural arrangement of the
Center. Given this range, it was clear
that the Center was not a program,
but a strategy for combating poverty.
When one examines the literature on
the War on Poverty, it becomes very
obvious that one of the prime goals
was to give the lower classes, and
particularly the ethnic minorities, a
middle-class mentality rather than
middle-class resources. Daniel P.
Moynihan makes it clear in his
report, The Negro Family: The Case
for National Action (1965), that, in
his view, the deterioration of the
black family is at the root of their
problems. In the 1960s, thousands of
pages were devoted to the “culture of
poverty” and how to break the “cycle
of poverty.” The argument ran: peo
ple can make their way out of poverty
through changes in attitude, motiva
tion, and willingness to make sacri
fices. The policy, aimed more at
changing the attitudes of mind than
at offering material help, was a psy
chological assault to give the poor
the motivation to work their own way
out of poverty. As Charles Valentine
(1968) has so ably shown, this was

Puerto Ricans began vowing to fight to
change their conditions and their way to power.
There was a difference in both the tone and the
tempo of their protest: the tone was bitter
and the tempo was frenetic.
Diálogo/ 13

only a subtle way of blaming poverty
on the poor.
The approach followed by social
service agencies and social workers
concentrated far too much on symp
toms rather than on causes—and on
symptoms seen and treated individu
ally rather than in connection with
other symptoms. This concern with
symptoms has been a reflection of
the preoccupation of the social work
profession with case work and the
study and treatment of individual
maladjustment. The goal of the
Division Street Urban Progress
Center was to teach “maladjusted
individuals” how to adapt themselves
to society as it was, rather than to
change those aspects of society that
made the individuals what they were.
In some instances, the services
offered at the Center would simply
substitute a new set of symptoms for
the old.
It’s little wonder that a larger
number of social scientists as well as
local residents of poor communities
throughout the country acquired a
growing sense of disenchantment
with the War on Poverty programs.
An abundance of evidence is found
that speaks to the limited impact
these programs had on poor people.
After reviewing governmental
actions in post-1967 in such impor
tant areas as poverty, education, and
housing, an Urban America and
Urban Coalition report entitled,
“One Year Later,” concluded that
“most actions and programs to meet
ghetto problems and grievances had
been, depending on the area, too lim
ited, under funded, or nonexistent”
(1969:114-118). The Division Street
Urban Progress Center represents a
sample case of a policy which
offered individualistic solutions to
members of this aggrieved Spanish
speaking population, as opposed to
structural solutions. Although
Community Action Programs in gen
eral reinforced the status quo by
coopting people into pseudo-conflicts
Dialogo/14

The goal of the Division Street Urban Progress
Center was to teach "malajusted individuals"
how to adapt themselves to society as it was,
rather than to change those aspects of society
that made the individuals what they were.
rather than engaging their members
in effective struggles, it was primari
ly the establishment of the Division
Street Urban Progress Center which
provided the impetus for political
activism among barrio residents.
Two separate dimensions of the
Center facilitated this: (1) the
employment of community residents
as part of its staff and (2) participation
in its advisory council by local commu
nity residents. More specifically, sever
al staff and advisory council members
of the Division Street Urban Progress
Center used their position and status
to politicize community residents on
behalf of their interests.

goal of building a mass-based perma
nent organization among barrio resi
dents. Several similar efforts were
followed in the 1970s but none
gained the city-wide scope of SACC.
The Spanish Action Committee
of Chicago was formed in June,
1966, “to enable local residents to
identify in an organized manner the
physical and social problems of the
community, to in te rp re t th ese
needs to city agencies, and work
toward implementing some com
m unity-based p ro g ram s” (A
Proposal to Develop an Urban
Service Training Center, submitted
by the Spanish Action Committee
of Chicago, not dated). During its
early period, only a cadre of volun
...ADVISORY COUNCIL ACTIVISM
teers constituted the membership
of SACC. Mr. Juan Diaz, a former
ne of the major organizations
member of Los Caballeros, was its
to emerge on the crest of the
Executive Director, and there was
Puerto Rican riot of 1966 was
a board of directors composed of
the Spanish Action Committee of
local residents. But because of the
Chicago (SACC). Several Puerto
tem per of the tim es, th is non
Rican leaders tried to seize the oppor
salaried hard core m anaged to
tunity presented by the rise of unrest
bring out ever-increasing numbers
in the Division Street Area to build a
of supporters for organizational
“formal organization” in the surecon
activities. During this early stage,
viction that this was the order of the
leaders of SACC concentrated on
day. The disruptive protests which
direct action, and the actions they
had characterized the Puerto Rican
led in the streets were generally
struggle during the summer of 1966
more militant and disruptive than
were quickly superseded by an
those of Los Caballeros and of ear
emphasis on the need for “communi
lier groups. They seized upon
ty organization,” and SACC was one
every grievance as an opportunity
expression of that change. Its leaders
for inciting mass actions, and chan
and organizers, while animated by
neled their energy into extensive
the spirit of protest, were neverthe
pam phleteering and agitation,
less more deeply committed to the
which helped bring community res
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idents together and raise the pitch
of anger to defiance. SACC orga
nized boycotts, picket lines, and
demonstrations to attack discrimi
nation in access to a wide range of
services. A summary report, pre
pared by SACC, indicates the more
notable involvement of the organi
zation during the period of 19671969:
1. Relocation of Division
Street Urban Progress Center
to its present location from
a store front.
SACC received complaints from
local residents pertaining to the limi
tations and service problems of the
then storefront Urban Progress
Center unit. SACC took action by
informing Dr. Dayton Brooks,
Director of Chicago Committee on
Urban Opportunities, that unless
something was done about these
problems, direct action would be
taken on the part of the community.
Dr. Brooks came and personally
inspected the facilities and ordered
that the present location, 1940 W.
Division St., was more suitable for
the Center.
2. Creation of the Humboldt
Park Recreation Committee.
In collaboration with more than
twenty Puerto Rican community
organizations and local residents, a
series of meetings and pickets were
organized against the Chicago Park
District. Our demands called for the
building of a large size swimming
pool and improvement of Humboldt
Park facilities and programs. Some
improvements were made, however,
the park district did not meet our
demands of a new and large swim
ming pool.
3. Removal of Policemen
from the 13th District.
SACC received various complaints
about certain police officers who
were using unlawful tactics and dis

crim inatory actions against the
Puerto Rican community. SACC's
legal committee circulated a petition,
gathering over 2,000 signatures. The
petition was taken to the Internal
Investigation Division of the Chicago
Police Department, and after much
examination several of these officers
were removed from this district.
4. Board of Education’s
Program is Defeated by
Community Parents.
After learning of a proposed
boundary change and the potentially
subsequent transfer of 300 students
from Von Humboldt School, SACC
arranged that the board's agency in
charge of these changes meet with
the Puerto Rican community. A pub
lic meeting was arranged and held at
the school, the parents opposed all
proposed changes. New boundaries
for Von Humboldt School were never
drawn.
SACC gained a wide and approv
ing audience by articulating feelings
which most Puerto Ricans shared but
feared to voice in public. The success
of SACC in mobilizing the barrio
poor and receiving support from
other emerging community groups
and organizations resulted, principal
ly, from its close affiliation with the
Division Street Urban Progress
Center—several members of SACC
were also members of the Center's
Advisory Council. This Council, com
prised of members from local busi
nesses and community service agen
cies, had a formal advisory role in
program planning within the Division
Street Area. From the beginning,
members of SACC were represented
in the Advisory Council's member
ship. There were times when one
SACC representative was a member
of the council; at other times, two
SACC members served as part of the
council's membership base.
Participation in the Center's
Advisory Council provided these
members with an excellent opportu

nity to learn a variety of political
skills. They learned about the inter
nal workings of this particular social
service agency, the interrelationship
between this agency and different
levels of government, where to go to
get things done, and the problems of
funding and program support. Just as
im portant, participation in the
Center’s Advisory Council kept mem
bers of SACC always informed of par
ticular policies, programs, issues, and
decisions concerning the Puerto
Rican community. Members of SACC
and other community representa
tives, serving on the Advisory
Council, operated consistently as a
voting block on contested issues and
were able to win on key issues
against the opposition of other board
members. A coalition was also orga
nized by SACC members to support
common demands on internal issues
within the Center involving budget
cut-backs, program choices, and per
sonnel appointments.
When an issue of great signifi
cance to the Puerto Rican communi
ty could not be resolved or treated by
the Advisory Council, the SACC
members would turn to their own
organization for a solution. The coali
tion established by the leaders of
SACC and community representa
tives did become engaged directly in
controversies involving other com
munity service agencies.
The essence of the new militancy
among Puerto Ricans was the basis
for the formation of institutions and
structures that could implement
organized actions and concerted and
coordinated programs to aid in the
ascent up the ladder. Those who sup
ported the new structures believed
that the ethnicity that already existed
among Puerto Ricans only needed to
be strengthened to become a factor
to be reckoned with.
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THE REPRESSION OF PROTEST
While dramatizing both the com
plex problems confronting Puerto
Rican residents of the city and the
urgent need for solutions to the
problems, the 1966 riot also marked
the beginning of a new wave of
Puerto Rican protest, one which is
still underway today. The Division
Street Riot put direct action on the
agenda of social change in the
Puerto Rican community. It made
Puerto Ricans realize that protest
could be used as an effective power
tool, stretching its influence into the
political process. However, as quick
ly as protest was introduced into the
Puerto Rican agenda, city officials
moved in to repress it.
The grudging support that had
been forthcoming to the Puerto
Rican community in the post-riot
years in the form of Community
Action Programs was now joined by
an increasingly repressive local
response to activism in the Division
Street Area. The emergence of a mil
itant leadership represented a direct
threat to the established order, and
therefore, had to be suppressed by
any means the authorities thought
necessary. There were countless

instances of intimidation, harass
ment, and surveillance directed at
the Puerto Rican groups and individ
uals who were viewed as presenting
a fundamental challenge to existing
power relationships.
Typical of the wide ranging treat
ment accorded black and other
activist groups in the late sixties and
early seventies by the CIA, the FBI,
the Defense Department, and local
police departments throughout the
country, the “policing of politics”
expanded considerably into the
Division Street Area following the
aftermath of the 1966 riot as police
intelligence units moved to gather
information on activists and potential
activists. Personal files were main
tained on a large number of barrio
residents. Equally revealing is the
range of individuals who were sur
veilled either as primary targets or
because of their alleged political
activism. Any individual who attend
ed a meeting in the community was
listed as an activist or sympathizer.
Even individuals who were consid
ered only remotely subversive or
whose personal and political activities
were irrelevant to any legitimate gov
ernmental interests became targets

Richard Daley (circa 1970) participating in the Puerto Rican Parade
down State Street
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of surveillance. A vivid illustration of
the reasons for surveilling persons
involved in community activities in
the Puerto Rican barrio comes from
the files of Obed López. Although
Obed López is Mexican, he was ini
tially classified as a Puerto Rican; and
his personal life was the subject of a
ten-day intensive surveillance by two
intelligence agents. Their report for a
sample day, records his going and
comings, car and license number,
when he parked his car and where,
etc.:
SUBJECT (Obed López) drives a
dark green Volkswagen, 11. Lic. #
HK 5026 which he usually parks on
the 1200-1300 blocks of California,
the 2800 block of Division, or the
1200 block of Washtenaw while in
the Division Street area.
SUBJECT (Obed López) is very
difficult to keep under surveillance
as he is very evasive. He will drive
in circles, stop on occasion for peri
ods ranging from 3-4 minutes, leave
his auto and walk up a block on one
side, and return on the other side to
a point near his auto where he
watches for anyone who might be
following him, and just about any
other tactic that might throw off a
surveillance, moving or stationary.
(Police Report, August 23, 1966).
The politics of Obed López were
analyzed by secret service agents in
this way:
Obed López is presently heading
up a Communist front organization
known as the Latin American
Defense Committee... (Police Report,
September 19,1966). SUBJECT
(Latin American Defense
Organization), under the direction
of Obed López, is currently conduct
ing a boycott of the National Food
Stores at 2650 & 2311 W. Division
Street, and has picketed both stores
on three occasions in groups of three.
The purpose of the boycott and picket
ing is to protest what they consider

Young Lord’s Festival confrontation with police. August, 1969
discriminatory hiring and personnel
practices by the National TEA
Company in relation to people of
Latin American extraction. In gen
eral, SUBJECT is using the
National TEA Company as a scape
goat for a “Pilot Program”they
believe will give them considerable
influence in the community, espe
cially among the small businessmen
who theyfeel will support them as
they are supposedly encouraging
Latins to buy from Latin owned busi
nessmen or businesses. (Police
Report, September 2 8 , 1966).
Subversive files were also main
tained on Puerto Rican community
organizations and groups composed

of individuals exercising their rights
of association and political protest.
Groups like the Young Lords, Aspira,
Inc. of Illinois, Organization for
Latin Americans in Chicago, Latin
American Defense Organization,
N orthw est Spanish Community
Committee, Latin Boy’s Club, and
others were investigated. The files of
the Organization for Latin Americans
(OLA) are illustrative. The organiza
tion was involved in working with
issues pertaining to housing, employ
ment, and civil rights. Although its
methods were entirely peaceful, it
was accused in the intelligence
reports of being communist and aim
ing to become the official voice of
Spanish-speaking people in Chicago

(Police Report, July 11,1966).
Perhaps the most celebrated sur
veilled group was SACC. SACC was
subjected to a wide range of official
control efforts by a unit of the
Chicago Police D epartm ent’s
Intelligence Division also referred to
as the Subversive Unit, the Security
Section, or the Red Squad. The
Subversive Unit used police officers
as infiltrators to spy on the activities
of SACC and at times to try to
provoke organization members into
foolish actions. There was an
Intelligence Unit’s police officer by
the name of Thomas Braham who
posed as a Spanish-speaking police
man; James Zorno was another
surveillance agent who passed as a
public relations person with exper
tise in the preparation of press releas
es. There were also four Spanish
speaking police officers: Victor Vega,
Andrew Rodriguez, Alfredo Perales,
and Edwin Olivieri. SACC was
deemed worthy of infiltration
primarily because, in the views of
the Chicago Police Department’s
Intelligence Unit, its ranks were filled
with communists and leftists. The
role of the police agents was to
encourage paranoia and internal dis
sension and to damage the public
image of SACC.
The agents’ entry into SACC was
facilitated by the structure of the
organization; it lacked resources and
people willing to undertake the
routine and time-consuming tasks
required of activists. The agents
brought badly needed skills and
resources. It was assumed by SACC
members that the agents’ ties to insti
tutions they claimed to represent
would give the organization added
strength of support. The entry of
these informants into SACC was fur
ther facilitated by the fact that the
organization was not comprised of a
highly centralized, formally orga
nized, tightly knit group of experi
enced activists, but was instead
decentralized, with fluid task
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Captain Coesfeld . . . They know him as a friend. June 15, 1966
assignments and an emphasis on
participation. Members were gen
erally not carefully screened, and
requirements for membership were
minimal. This was all the more true
in cases of social action demonstra
tions, meetings, and marches—in
which anyone could participate.
The em ergent non-institutional
ized, social movement character of
the struggle, as advanced by
SACC, meant constantly changing
plans, shifting alliances, and spon
taneous actions. SACC’s ideology
stre sse d peaceful nonviolent
means, reform, democracy, open
ness, an anti-bureaucratic orienta
tion, optimistic faith in people, tol
erance, community, and naivete
about governm ent surveillance.
SACC had nothing to hide; the
group saw little reason to be suspi
cious. Several “investig ato r’s
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re p o rts ”, prepared for the
Intelligence Division of the Chicago
Police Department by undercover
police officers and filed during the
summer of 1966, reveal the direct
and active part played by these offi
cers in the ultimate dissolution of
SACC. In one of the earliest reports
the investigating officer indicates
very explicitly that the objective of
his undertaking “was to destroy the
SUBJECT
[S panish A ction
Committee of Chicago], its leaders
and community influence” (June,
1966). In another re p o rt dated
August 19, 1966, the reporting offi
cer noted: “I launched an all out
anti-Ted Vélez, anti-Juan Diaz cam
paign amongst the original commit
tee members of subject organiza
tion, with emphasis on the subver
sive intonations.”
If the repressive actions directed

at SACC were to be successful, the
involvement of some of the organiza
tion’s members were required in the
plot. The undercover Red Squad offi
cers used intimidation tactics to gain
the support of a few organization
members. The police officers con
vinced these members that the orga
nization’s involvement in communistrelated activities would ultimately
cause them a great deal of harm and
pain. In particular, Ted and Myrta
Ramirez were two SACC members
identified by the infiltrators as
prospective collaborators since,
according to the police officers, both
members were very dissatisfied with
the way the organization was being
run. One investigator’s report, which
details the content of a meeting
between one police officer and Mr.
and Mrs. Ramirez, demonstrates the
intimidating tactics used by the offi
cers and, at the same time, the resis

tance expressed by these two SACC
members to the idea of aiding the
police with the expulsion from the
organization of its alleged commu
nists and leftists:
[Police officer] then advised
[Mrs. Ramirez] of the fact that
communists are undisputed masters
of deceit, and will seize on any pop
ular or controversial issue for their
own cause. [Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez]
both seemed in agreement with this,
but were slightly reluctant when the
[police officer] said he would like
their help in removing any commu
nist influence from SACC. Theyfeel
that SACC has a lot ofpotential,
and would never allow communists
to take over, but would inform the
[police officer] of the presence of
any new or suspicious persons who
might try to get into SACC. (August
19,1966).
In an interview, Mr. Richard
Gutman, the Attorney representing
SACC, stated very clearly that those
who defected from the organization
were truly victims of the tactics used
by the Red Squad. He pointed out,
for instance, that the undercover
police officer who passed as a
Spanish-speaking policeman con
vinced these members that SACC
was a communist organization and
that its leaders had been convicted of
possession of narcotics. In the words
of Mr. Gutman: Ted and Myrta were
victims too. They were used. The
various police reports make it clear
that Ted and Myrta did not necessar
ily want to quit SACC; this wasn't
their idea. They were totally opposed
to putting out the stuff about com
munism.
In any event, after several meet
ings, the police officers manipulated
Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez into resigning
from SACC and forming a competing
organization. Shortly after the resig
nation of these persons, the
American Spanish Speaking Peoples
Association (ASSPA) was born. In
another investigator's report, the

role played by the surveillance offi
cers in the formation of ASSPA is
clearly stated:
The SUBJECT was secretly orga
nized by members of the Intelligence
Division and composed offormer
members of the Spanish Action
Committee of Chicago. Although the
members know nothing of the part
played by the Intelligence Division,
they have been directed to a point
where they will publicly denounce
SACC and its leader, Juan Diaz and
his followers and associates for acts
not to the best interest of
the Spanish-speaking community,
and for the Communist influence
they believe exists there. (August
31, 1966).
The undercover officers then pro
ceeded, successfully, to convince
members of the newly created orga
nization to prepare a press release
announcing the establishment of
ASSPA. After examining the text of
the original press release prepared
by members of ASSPA, the police
officer assigned to this investigation
concluded that it was insufficient for
the desired goals of the police
departm ent: They did prepare a
press release that said very little as
to what their reasons were for resign
ing from SUBJECT organization, at
which time I felt it necessary to ask
for the assistance of a “friend of the
family” by the name of “Dr. Baron”,

an expert in the preparation of
Press releases,... [but] who is in
actuality Officer James Zarnow
(Investigator's Report, August 19,
1966). The entire text of this release
is printed below to provide insights
into the course of direction former
members of SACC were driven to
follow:
We, the members ofASSPA are for
the most part, former members of the
Spanish Action Committee of
Chicago, who have arrived at the
realization that SACC does not rep
resent the Puerto Rican community
or any of the Spanish Speaking as a
whole. It has done nothing more
than keep the Spanish community
apart from the society it should be
becoming a part of
SACC is being led by a man who is
directed by individuals in New York
who know nothing about Chicago,
and only want to maintain discon
tent and anger among the Puerto
Ricans who live in Chicago. It is
influenced by some people who have
Communist philosophies and who
have been before the hearings of the
House Committee on Un-American
Activities and Fair Play for Cuban
Investigations. When organized, our
group was dedicated to helping the
Latin American peoples in Chicago;
we were staff members, but every
time we suggested methods to help
make citizens of the people of our

...the "policing of politics" expanded consider
ably into the Division Street area following the
aftermath of the 1966 riot as police intelligence
units moved to gather information on activists
and potential activists.
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community, we found ourselves pow
erless. This was possible because the
Director of SACC, Juan Diaz
assumed dictatorial power over the
organization. We have never been
told where ourfinancial aid came
from; we were given no information
regarding the amount of money the
organization had; Diaz refused to
keep records and made all decisions.
To us, it appears that the only inter
ests served by SACC were to the ben
efit ofJuan Diaz and others who do
not serve the interest of our country.
We have since learned that this man
Diaz is a convicted narcotic offender
and of all things, he is presently the
director of the Latin American Boys
Club; and to our knowledge has no
qualification as such director.
True, we are Puerto Ricans,
Mexicans, Cubans and South
Americans, but here, we are all
Americans first. We should not be
trying to set ourselves apart, but
becoming part of the society we live
in. Your descendants were strangers
to the ways of their new land and
many of them were not at first
accepted, but they and their chil
dren eventually overcame this. They
were assimilated into the society
around them, as we and our chil
dren are and will be. SACC does
not want this to happen; they want
the Latin to feel apart, keep them
angry, keep reminding that they are
apart and make them believe they
are not treated the same as other
citizens. This is not true. Despite
those people who preach hate, tell

lies to incite us, we are progressing
and are accepted more and more
each day. We are learning these
things and those of us who have
learned are helping those who need
help. We are not a minority group,
we are a majority group, we are
Americans.
The resignation of SACC mem
bers and the subsequent establish
ment of ASSPA was carefully and
strategically staged by the undercov
er agents. The agents persuaded Bob
Weidrich of the Chicago Tribune to
use the press release and responses
gathered from an interview with Mr.
and Mrs. Ramirez to expose SACC,
Diaz and etc. (Investigator’s Report,
August 31, 1966). (It turned out that
the undercover agents supplied the
Tribune correspondent with the
questions to ask during this inter
view. Also, one of the agents was pre
sent during the interview to provide
the correct answers to the questions
in cases when the two respondents’
replies were not in line with the
expected response.) In a two-part
series, Weidrich reported almost
exclusively on allegations regarding
the involvement of communist indi
viduals in SACC. He made the claim
that one reputed Communist provid
ed SACC with both financial and advi
sory support. This particular individ
ual was said to have been a former
Fair Play for Cuba committee official.
Further, the reports charged that
SACC was being taken over by out
siders: Puerto Ricans from New York
who were also alleged as communist
affiliated and a Californian alleged

The undercover Red Squad officers used
intimidation tactics to gain the support
of a few organization members.
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to have been a former head of
the Young Communist League of
C alifo rn ia (Chicago T rib u n e ,
September 3-4,1966).
The police officers also arranged
for Alfredo Torres de Jesús, a writer
for El Puertorriqueño, to use the
Chicago Tribune information for a
local publication. A week later, El
Puertorriqueño’s front-page, lead
story was almost a complete transla
tion of Weidrich’s articles. However,
Mr. Torres de Jesús sensationalized
the story by calling it: “SACC
ES NIDO DE COMUNISTAS”—
SACC is a nest of Communists
(El P u e rto rriq u e ñ o , W eek of
September 9-15,1966), contributing
more severely to the damage and dis
credit of the organization.
The press played an indispensable
role in the planned disruption
of SACC. The combined articles
attracted a great deal of attention.
The publicized charges that SACC
was communist affiliated not only
served to drive out some members
(except for two, all other officers of
the organization resigned their post),
but also to scare off potential recruits
and supporters. The charges made
against SACC raised the cost and
danger of being active in the organi
zation, and supporters feared their
careers would be ruined if they con
tinued their affiliation. The testi
monies of several of these supporters
at a trial filed by SACC against the
city of Chicago gives weight to this
point:
Those articles had a very great
negative effect on SACCs reputa
tion in the Puerto Rican communi
ty. Because of those articles, SACC
gained a reputation for being con
trolled or influenced by communists.
This reputation greatly decreased
the Puerto Rican community s will
ingness to work with SACC. I quit
SACC when I read in the newspa
per that the organization was taken
over by communists...
There was a lot of conversation
about [the newspaper] articles.

"...True, we are
Puerto Ricans,
Mexicans, Cubans
and South
Americans, but here,
we are all Americans
first. We should not
be trying to set
ourselves apart,
but becoming part
of the society we
live in."
-Press release announcing ASSPA

People were very negative. They
thought the information was real,
and then nobody wanted to be asso
ciated with the Communist Party. I
did not want to be associated with
the organization, I stopped going to
meetings. I did not want to be
known as a communist.
There is little doubt that political
repression, as manifested in surveil
lance and disruption activities, signif
icantly disrupted and discredited
SACC and thereby made the organi
zation less attractive to members and
sympathizers. A present-day mem
ber of SACC informed me in an inter
view: “We were set back an entire
generation. The Chicago Police
Department hampered our growth.
We had a very good reputation in the
community before the smears in the
Tribune and El Puertoriqueno.”
Similarly, Richard Gutman said: “The
evidence clearly shows that SACC
was the major group in the Puerto
Rican community during the sum
mer of 1966. But after the press pub
lication, it never recovered its former
position. It continued to function,
it rem ained active, but it never
regained its early form.”
In addition, increased police
repression significantly deterred
some people form speaking out,
demonstrating, or joining protest
groups, and thereby weakened the
capacity for political activism in the
Division Street Area. Government
and police officials demonstrated
that open defiance by Puerto Ricans
was extremely dangerous and often
suicidal. Despite this, there is much
evidence to suggest that political
repression did not significantly deter
protest activities in el barrio. Protest
increased even as political repres
sion increased, at least until 1975.
Regardless of the various official
repressive actions taken against
members of barrio-based political
activist organizations and groups,
the organizer and m ass-agitator

types of leaders continued to repre
sent a very im portant part of
Chicago’s Puerto Rican community.
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